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	<title>Comments on: Social dilemmas in Behavior Economics</title>
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		<title>By: Shane Curran</title>
		<link>http://www.discusseconomics.com/behavioral-economics/social-dilemmas-in-behavior-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-31804</link>
		<dc:creator>Shane Curran</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Mar 2011 18:14:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Grant raises an important point.  If this is a one shot game (to continue with the above example this would be the case if the two salesmen only did one deal together) then a rational individual will always cheat.  If the game is played over and over again and there is communication (i.e. the ability to &quot;collude&quot;) then the possibility of cooperation arises.  In theory individuals will cooperate (collude) if the future value of colluding is greater than the one time reward for cheating.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Grant raises an important point.  If this is a one shot game (to continue with the above example this would be the case if the two salesmen only did one deal together) then a rational individual will always cheat.  If the game is played over and over again and there is communication (i.e. the ability to "collude") then the possibility of cooperation arises.  In theory individuals will cooperate (collude) if the future value of colluding is greater than the one time reward for cheating.</p>
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		<title>By: Grant</title>
		<link>http://www.discusseconomics.com/behavioral-economics/social-dilemmas-in-behavior-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-29037</link>
		<dc:creator>Grant</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2010 15:37:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>If &#039;cheating&#039; results in the most gain for the individual, what keeps people cooperating?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If 'cheating' results in the most gain for the individual, what keeps people cooperating?</p>
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